1.8.8 Privatisation and Regulation — Practice Questions
Seven original multiple-choice questions on public ownership, privatisation, regulation and deregulation, written to the style and difficulty of AQA Paper 3 Section A.
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7 questions in this set
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1. Privatisation is best defined as
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Answer: B (The transfer of ownership of an enterprise from the state to the private sector.). Privatisation moves an enterprise out of public ownership and into private hands. The case for it rests on the profit motive sharpening incentives to cut costs and innovate, and on competition where it can be introduced. Note that it is distinct from deregulation, which removes rules but says nothing about who owns the firm.
Why the other options are wrong
- A — Removing rules and restrictions is deregulation. The two often happen together but they are separate policies.
- C — Transfer in the opposite direction is nationalisation, a form of public ownership.
- D — Price capping is regulation, frequently applied after privatisation to control a private monopoly.
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2. The main economic argument in favour of privatising a state-owned enterprise is that
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Answer: D (The profit motive gives stronger incentives to cut costs and innovate.). A state-owned enterprise has no shareholders demanding a return and no threat of takeover or bankruptcy, so the pressure to control costs is weak and X-inefficiency can build up. Private ownership introduces the profit motive, which rewards cutting costs and innovating — and where competition can be introduced alongside it, consumers gain through lower prices and better service.
Why the other options are wrong
- A — Nothing guarantees allocative efficiency. Privatising a natural monopoly without effective regulation can leave prices higher, since a private monopolist maximises profit.
- B — Regulation usually continues after privatisation, and for natural monopolies it is essential.
- C — Sale proceeds are a real fiscal benefit, but they are a one-off. The lasting economic argument concerns efficiency.
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3. A government keeps a natural monopoly water supplier in public ownership rather than privatising it. The strongest economic argument for doing so is that
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Answer: A (A private monopolist would restrict output and charge above marginal cost.). A natural monopoly cannot be broken up without raising average costs, so competition is not available as a discipline. Left in private hands and unregulated, the firm would maximise profit by restricting output and charging above marginal cost — allocative inefficiency in an essential service. Public ownership allows output to be set closer to the allocatively efficient point where AR = MC, delivering lower prices and higher output at the cost of lower profit.
Why the other options are wrong
- B — Public ownership carries its own risk of X-inefficiency, since the profit motive and the threat of failure are both absent.
- C — There is no reason to assume public managers are more capable. The argument rests on the firm's objectives, not the quality of its staff.
- D — State-owned firms can and do make losses; they are simply covered by the taxpayer, which is itself a cost.
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4. Deregulation is best described as
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Answer: C (The removal of legal barriers and restrictions from a market.). Deregulation removes rules that restrict entry or conduct — licensing requirements, statutory monopolies, restrictions on who may compete. Its purpose is to raise contestability: with barriers lowered, the threat of entry disciplines incumbent firms even before any new firm arrives.
Why the other options are wrong
- A — Selling a state enterprise is privatisation, which changes ownership rather than the rules.
- B — Splitting up a dominant firm is a structural competition remedy, usually imposed by a regulator.
- D — Imposing a price cap is regulation — adding a rule rather than removing one.
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5. Regulatory capture occurs when a regulator
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Answer: A (Becomes too close to the firms it regulates.). Regulatory capture is the tendency for a regulator, over time, to identify with the industry it supervises rather than with consumers. It happens because the regulator depends on the firms for information and expertise, and because staff often move between the two. The result is weak enforcement and prices or standards set to suit producers — a form of government failure, since the intervention meant to correct market failure ends up entrenching it.
Why the other options are wrong
- B — A regulator's funding arrangements are a practical matter and not what the term describes.
- C — Excessive fines would be over-zealous enforcement, which is the opposite failing.
- D — Departmental reorganisation is an administrative change with no bearing on whose interests are served.
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6. A regulator imposes a price cap on a privatised natural monopoly. The main purpose is to
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Answer: C (Prevent the firm exploiting its market power.). Where competition cannot realistically be introduced, regulation substitutes for it. A price cap stops the monopolist charging what its market power would allow, holding prices closer to the competitive level and protecting consumers. Caps of the RPI−X form go further, requiring real prices to fall each year and so building in an incentive to find efficiency savings.
Why the other options are wrong
- A — The cap limits profit rather than guaranteeing it. That is precisely its purpose.
- B — Restricting output is the behaviour being prevented, not encouraged.
- D — Barriers to entry in a natural monopoly stem from its cost structure. A price cap cannot remove them, which is why regulation is needed in the first place.
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7. A government privatises a natural monopoly without establishing an effective regulator. The most likely outcome is that
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Answer: B (Consumers face higher prices and lower output than before.). Privatisation delivers efficiency gains through competition and the profit motive — but a natural monopoly cannot be made competitive, because duplicating the network would raise average costs for everyone. Transferred to private hands without regulation, the firm keeps the monopoly and gains a profit-maximising objective, so it restricts output and raises price. Consumers end up worse off than under public ownership.
This is why privatisation of utilities has always been accompanied by a regulator, and why the design of that regulation matters more than the transfer of ownership itself.Why the other options are wrong
- A — The market does not fragment. The single network remains intact under one owner, which is the source of the problem.
- C — Perfect competition requires many firms and free entry. The cost structure of a natural monopoly rules both out.
- D — With no competition and no price cap, supernormal profit is exactly what the new owners can expect to earn.
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